Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. 
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EVOLVING MILITARY STRATEGY AND DEVELOPING HOMELAND SECURITY: AN OPPORTUNITY TO SHARE RESOURCES
Terrorism poses a clear and present danger to the citizens of the United States. Terrorists are patient, flexible, adaptable and determined adversaries. They seek out the seams and vulnerabilities in the defenses of their potential targets. The horrific events of 9-11 have left little doubt in any American's mind that preparing first line responders and local elected and appointed officials is of paramount importance.
?Tom Arminio, Patriot-News Harrisburg, Pa 16 Nov 2003 The events of 11 September 2001 (9/11) dramatically altered the U.S. view of war.
Today's U.S. military capability effectively marginalizes conventional military threats to domestic and overseas interests. To avoid it's military strengths, threats to the U.S. are evolving in the form of "asymmetric threats". American military strategy is evolving to address the more probable asymmetric threats of terrorism and to counter Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) attacks.
The following current U.S. strategies address these new asymmetric threats:
§ The National Security Strategy of the United States of America § The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism § The National Strategy for Homeland Security § The National Military Strategy (Quadrennial Defense Review)
However, these national strategies are not fully developed or integrated down to the appropriate responsive and actionable levels. Lack of an integrated national strategy increases U.S. vulnerablability to attack as well as impacts its ability to effecitively respond to and recover from an attack. Prior to 9/11, Americans relied on security strategies designed to meet and defeat it's enemies off-shore. But by their nature, asymmetric attacks are more difficult to detect and prevent. Thus, asymmetric attackers will exploit seams in U.S. security posture. President
Bush recognized these vulnerabilities and made significant organizational changes by establishing the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and realigning other federal agencies into the DHS.
The creation of the DHS has provided a significant step toward integrating domestic agencies and local governments to meet national strategy objectives. However, we can still improve our preparations to counter the evolving asymmetric threat. One area for making improvements is to expand Military Assistance to Civil Authorities (MACA) beyond the traditional natural disaster assistance to include counter-terrorist assistance.
This Strategy Research Project traces the recent evolution of U.S. military strategy that set the stage for the current environment. It then analyzes the current threat environment and the roles of U.S. security organizations. It concludes with recommendations for a more cooperative relationship and greater sharing of resources between the DOD and Homeland Security organizations.
DEFINING ASYMMETRIC THREATS
Terrorist events offer tangible, tragic illustrations of asymmetric threats to U.S. interests.
Dictionaries generally define asymmetric as: not symmetrical or lacking proportion. But two more extensive definitions which provide strategic insight beyond the commonplace reference to "asymmetrical threats" are: § "Asymmetric" describes a situation in which an adversary employs weaponry or tactics in unexpected or unsanctioned ways. Asymmetry also describes a situation in which the attacker is willing to use weapons and tactics that the victim is unwilling to use, possibly because they are viewed as immoral or illegal. The use of asymmetric weapons and tactics can enable an adversary to win against a more powerful enemyan enemy that may be unable or unwilling to respond in-kind-as history has repeatedly proven. There will be two Iraqi military strategies employed for the foreseeable future. Iraqi forces supported by the U.S. led coalition will focus on internal stabilization. The remnants of the faild Iraqi regime will employ a second strategy of of aysmmetric or unconventional warfare against the U.S. led coalition.
The first strategy will rely on the U.S. or possibly the United Nations (U.N.) to address external defense since Iraq is incapable of addressing external threats or opportunities. In the near term, the Iraqis should rely on the U.S. to reduce the turmoil associated with a potential change in military leadership from coalition to U.N. forces. In the long term, Iraq will need UN recognition for legitimacy so that it can return to full international trade and diplomatic participation.
The second strategy, asymmetric warfare tactics, or terrorism, directed against the coalition will persist for the foreseable future. Current strategy is to attack the will of the U.S. and to continue to attrit the national will by sending U.S. soldiers home in body bags and appealing to world opinion as to the legitimacy and viability of the U.S. led coalition. Saddam loyalists are relying on applied pressure from the international community as well as from within U.S. borders to cause the U.S. to disengage from Iraq. 8 The U.S. will have to adjust the implemenation of its military strategy to the asymmetric attacks and unconventional warfare taking place within Iraq.
It is clear that the executi on of military power was decisive, but it remains to be seen whether or not it contributes to the overall evident success that Blechman described. 9 U.S.
leadership employed a preemptive strategy to defeat terrorism and asymmetric threats in Iraq. It is argued that these threats would have eventually presented themselves on U.S. soil. It also became clear to all potential enemies that directly engaging U.S. military capabilities requires significant resources and invites extraordinary levels of risk. Enemies will have to use other methods to sucessfully engage the U.S. to attack its vulnerabilities, not its strengths.
To succeed in Iraq, the U.S. needs to provide better domestic security for the Iraqi population. To defend our homeland, we need to bolster our ability to counter terrorist attacksprimarily a DHS task. Clearly, the DOD and DHS must be prepared to respond to asymmetric threats. The departments should expand their efforts to jointly provide U.S. domestic security with a more wholistic perspective-from overseas and into the continental U.S. The following discusses the commonality of the threat and potential for sharing resources to enhance the joint domestic security efforts.
THE CHANGED ENVIRONMENT AND THREAT
In the Cold War system, the most likely threat to our olive tree was from another olive tree. It was from your neighbor coming over, violently digging up your olive tree and planting his in its place. .... The biggest threat today to your olive tree is likely to come from the Lexus?from all the anonymous, transnational, homogenizing, standardizing market forces and technologies that make up today's globalizing economic system. There are some things about this system that can make the Lexus so overpowering it can overrun and overwhelm every olive tree in sight?breaking down communities, steamrolling environments and crowding out traditions?and this can produce a real olive tree backlash.
?Thomas L. Friedman April 2000
The Lexus and the Olive Tree The decisive events of 9/11 caused the U.S. to reconsider national security strategy and examine asymmetric threats to domestic assets. Prior to 9/11, the most significant adjustment to missions and roles of any federal emergency response agencies was the Federal Emegency Mangagment Agency (FEMA) shifting its resources from civil defense to disaster relief and recovery operations. 10 FEMA did this at the end of the Cold War because there were no percieved defense threats to domestic interests. Prior to 9/11, terrorists using asymmetric means had attacked the U.S. on numerous occaisions with no discernable change in national security strategy. The events summarized in Table 1 The reaction to the September and October 2001 anthrax attacks and previous public reaction to the explosion of TWA Flight 800 in July 1996, established that with catastrophic events, the immediate U.S. media mindset is to assume terrorism at work until proven otherwise. The anthrax attacks were later proven by the FBI to be terrorist attacks.
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Collectively, these events had a profound impact on the strategic environment and U.S. security interests. U.S. citizens no longer expect immunity from the changing face of global threats.
THE HOMELAND SECURITY THREAT AND ENVIRONMENT
It is clear that enemies will use asymmetric delivery means against U.S.civil targets. The events of 9/11 provided conclusive evidence that domestic facilities and assets are targets and can effectively be engaged by asymmetric means. Comments by the Secretary of Defense reflect that DOD is transforming its strategies to counter the evolving threat in the current strategic environment. The Secretary of Defense also recognized enemy use of asymmetric attacks is causing the U.S. to shift its threat based strategy and focus.
"We need to change not only the capabilities at our disposal, but also how we think about war. All the high-tech weapons in the world will not transform the U.S. armed forces unless we also transform the way we think, the way we train, the way we exercise and the way we fight".
? nature, are difficult to detect before they act, it is imperative that the U.S. prevent and prepare for counter action in the domestic domain.
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The threat to domestic interests will focus on key nodes in the U.S. infrastructure such as economic hubs. Terrorists will target high-value assets possessing the potential to dramatically disrupt daily life in the U.S., create casualties and gain immediate and widespread media coverage. High-value assets include symbols of our national sovereignty, transportation and utilities, prominent leaders and their families, and events of national interest such as championship sporting events. They will also target urbanized areas which are difficult to protect yet will yield high casualty rates or dramatic results from the application of WMD or the unconventional application of conventional tools.
Our enemies purpose seems to be to attack the will of the American people and influence the political forces within the U.S.. Terrorists could easily use suicide bombers, mail bombs, WMD and chemical hoaxes to replicate the effects of on-going Iraqi terrorist attacks within the U.S.. Terrorists lack conventional military, diplomatic and economic power. Terrorists wield power through media attention gained by the shock effects of their attacks. Thus, terrorists believe they can counter their lack of conventional power to achieve their objectives.
HOMELAND SECURITY AND HOMELAND DEFENSE
The U.S. National Strategy for Homeland Security defines homeland security (HLS) as:
"the concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce the vulnerability of the United States to terrorism, and minimize the damage and assist in the recovery from terrorist attacks". 14 Homeland defense is defined as: "the military protection of the United States territory, domestic population, and critical defense infrastructure against external threats and aggression". Unlike the DOD, the DHS has no command and control authority over Reserves or National Guard forces. National Guard forces operate solely under state control unless activated by federal authority. However, the federal government provides the National Guard the majority of the financial resources and equipment which is common to active component forces.
Mixed funding and control relationships create organizational and planning gaps or "seams", depending on the specific activation status of National Guard units. Emergency response planners for the DOD and DHS must remember that control of units will vary depending on federal activation or deployment status. DHS planners must also take into account that states do not receive or generate replacement units for activated or deployed National Guard units.
Current planning, organizing and response processes for domestic incidents create "seams" in homeland security. Within the U.S. planning framework, domestic incidents are viewed as local events until they escalate beyond the response capability of the local government. Thus, a significant time lag can occur from initial evaluation of a local civil issue to identifying the issue as a national security or defense event.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE OFFSHORE FOCUS CREATES "SEAMS"
Historically, the Department of Defense (DOD) has been organized, trained and equipped for the conduct of military operations against military adversaries outside the continental U.S.. The DOD also has provided military assistance to civil authorities (MACA) in emergency situations. Normally in response to natural disasters, military assistance is provided to support another agency when that agency responds to an event or set of circumstances.
Thus, the DOD has maintained a reactive mindset in its approach to domestic events. 17 Due to events of 9/11, it is now conceivable military operations for homeland defense may be conducted on domestic soil with the DOD as the lead agency with assistance from civil authorities. This concept is embedded in the DOD's requirement to provide consequence management as part of its MACA mission. Consequence management, by its nature, is reactive and does not insure sufficient attention to threat awareness, deterring actions or training for asymmetric threats to U.S. domestic interests.
The DOD can improve civil response processes in support of homeland security objectives. A more pro-active DOD approach to civil preparedness will better serve domestic security interests. The asymmetric nature of terrorist threats and attacks can rapidly escalate from a local domestic response to national security events, thus exploiting a "seam" in preparedness, due to time lags in determining the scope, coordinating and executing a national response. These lags occur as authorities determine jurisdiction and capability required to counter the event. The Guard and the Reserves share common training, equipment and command and control systems. However, these systems are designed for military purposes and not specifically suited for MACA.
RESERVE COMPONENTS: PRIMARY MACA RESOURCE
IMPROVING SECURITY AND SHARING RESOURCES
PROVIDING MORE EFFECTIVE CIVIL RESPONSE
The similiarity of threat environments and counter threat responses, present DOD and DHS with similar and potentially overlapping operational environments. 
TRAINING CAPABILITIES
Training is the key focus area as it serves to clarify or mitigate issues in the other areas.
It also provides the most immediate economical impact on cooperative security efforts.
Organizations can minimize procedural and operational cultural differences and equipment interoperability issues through recurring combined training exercises. Training together creates understanding and interoperability, reducing organizational "seams" between agencies in the performance of homeland security and defense missions. Training will also identify potential weaknesses within existing plans and facilitate routine responses in times of emergency.
The DOD can provide training opportunities and facilities to enhance civil-military training events. DOD resources can be used to facilitate training at all levels from the individual through staff cell training. The DOD has made significant investments in live, virtual and constructive training sites and capabilities that have civil response application consistent with DHS mission requirements. Operating in the urban environment presents significant technical and tactical control issues. The physics of the environment and technology limitations make it difficult for operational units to maintain tactical communications and situational awareness. The DOD has several development programs that may produce technical solutions to these problems.
Through a joint working group, the DOD and DHS could manage the various requirements and share development costs.
NEAR TERM RECOMMENDATIONS
Within the next year, the DOD and DHS must develop a joint vision of how the respective agencies will integrate existing capabilities. They must also develop concept plans for sharing resources, joint technology development and improving interagency coordination.
The DOD and DHS should host range and training conferences for the purpose o f scheduling facility usage and educating civil authorities about existing DOD training capabilities.
Scheduling joint and civil-military training exercises is a logical output of this training conference. 
LONG TERM CONSIDERATIONS
The executive leadership of the DOD and DHS should more closely integrate U.S.
national strategies and initiate actions to ensure operational plans are put into place to support the strategies. A critical element of this effort may be the integration of national and local intelligence networks and assets to quickly and appropriately disseminate threat information.
Providing secure internet to local authorities that accesses national level threat information should be considered.
Improving U.S. security in an efficient manner requires an integrated approach to HLS and HLD. Immediate security requirements will be the short term factor for daily actions but the U.S. should place more emphasis on long term efforts and plans. DHS has initiated strategic actions which provide member agencies and other agencies increased access to threat information and techology. The department is using information technology to manage and distribute information which they gather from numerous electronic sources to reduce alert and response times. 27 Plugging the DOD into the DHS networks will eliminate seams between security and defense and provide a more coherent, wholistic picture of the threat environment and therefore improve both security and defense.
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